Thursday, 28 January 2010 13:28 S.H.A.N.
On 26 January, Poisoned Hills: Opium Cultivation surges under government control in Burma, a 56 page report by the Palaung Women’s Organization (PWO) was launched at Bangkok’s Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT). The following is an overview given by Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) on the occasion.
I had read the report with great interest. There are, I think, 5 points made by the writers:
• Areas transferred to the Burma Army by ceasefire groups are booming with poppy fields
• Military authorities are exacting protection fees from the poppy farmers
• Authorities tolerate drug involvement of their allies while it is politically expedient, and then use the issue to crack down on them when they show signs of dissent
• Opium growing is replacing traditional Palaung tea growing
• Increase of drug production is linked to militarization
All these points are in line with our own findings.
Areas transferred to the Burma Army by ceasefire groups are booming with poppy fields
In the Shan State, the largest commercially grown poppy fields, until 2006, were in 3 areas: Kokang, Wa and Loimaw (the last one incidentally is the late Khun Sa’s birthplace).
But the three, in 2003, 2005 and 2006 respectively became opium free. Since then cultivation has moved to Burma Army controlled areas by a process known as Balloon Effect which means when you squeeze one end of the balloon, it swells up in the other end.
(Khun Seng, Khun Sa’s uncle was reported to have remarked in late 2007, that beginning the 2007-08 season, the Wa withdrawal from the field would not matter anymore, as the rest of Shan State were replacing the shortfall.
On the other hand, the Wa output had been grossly exaggerated, according to Ko-Lin Chin’s The Golden Triangle (2009). “The Wa area could produce no more than 100,000 kg (100 tons) a year,” he quoted Zhou Dafu, Deputy Director of the Wa Central Authority, P.55-56)
More than 10 years after its implementation, the 15 year (1999-2014) opium eradication master plan has yet to offer significant results. Out of 51 targeted townships (43 in Shan, 4 in Kachin and 2 each in Chin and Kayah), only 13 of them can so far claim opium free or almost free of poppies. The only thing significant is the fact that 9 out of these 13 townships are under the ceasefire groups’ control. (For details, see Shan Drug Watch 2009 Newsletter, P. 7-8)
On top of it is the fact that many untargeted townships have become poppy growers. So have untargeted states and divisions like Arakan, Mandalay, Sagaing and Magwe. It has even crossed the western border into Bangladesh’s Chittagong hills.
Military authorities are exacting protection fees from the poppy farmers
Military authorities, at least on the local level, are certainly engaged in this pastime. Mongton, opposite Chiangmai, is an example. Burma Army-backed militias are collecting protection fees for the military there. Unlike their top generals who are getting paid by businessmen seeking concessions for gold, minerals, gems and such, they don’t have that kind of luxury. In addition, they have been under the self reliance policy (to feed, clothe and even equip themselves) since 1996. That is why they are destroying less poppy acres than they are reporting to their superiors. That is why they are faking the facts and figures in their reports. Because they have to depend on the local people for their own existence.
Authorities tolerate drug involvement of their allies while it is politically expedient, and then use the issue to crack down on them when they show signs of dissent
In August, Kokang, an area in Shan State under the control of Peng Jiasheng, the ceasefire leader, was invaded and occupied by the Burma Army, when he refused to accept the Border Guard Force program offered by Naypyitaw.
This is nothing unusual, if we have been following events in Burma from the beginning:
1960 The Burma Army set up People’s Militias aka Ka-Kwe-Ye against Shan rebels. Two of the known militia leaders then were Law Hsinghan and Khun Sa. Their involvement in drugs was encouraged and protected by the Burma Army.
1989 The Burma Army began supporting the former rebel groups that concluded ceasefire agreements against remaining rebel movements, including Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army, that had chosen to fight against it
2004 (after Gen Khin Nyunt’s fall) The militias were once again came under the blessings against the ceasefire groups and the other rebel movements, especially, since last year. They are so well protected that drug entrepreneurs are relying on them both for protection and transportation. Militia transports are rarely stopped at junta checkpoints.
Opium growing is replacing traditional Palaung tea growing
In Shan State, there are two main non-Shan ethnic groups: Palaung and PaO. The Palaung report has said that many of the farmers are turning to poppy planting instead of their traditional tea planting. “This is because the regime has been controlling the price of tea, while commodity prices have been rising, so farmers cannot earn a living from tea anymore. It also takes three years to grow tea before it can be picked and sold, but opium can be grown and sold during only one season (4 months).” That is the same situation for the PaO who have for centuries been known as cheroot leaf planters. But nowadays their cheroot leaf plantations are making way for poppy plantations, a sort of crop substitution in the opposite direction. One PaO publication had even mourned: PaOs used to be synonymous with cheroot leaves. Now poppy flowers are replacing them as our new national symbol.
Increase of drug production is linked to militarization
That is obviously because of the militarization of politics in Burma. During the British days, when they had a total of 15 infantry battalions in the whole of Burma, of which 2 were in Shan State, opium production was under control. But when the number of infantry battalions has climbed up to more than 500, more than 150 in Shan State alone, opium production is out of control. That is because these army units are placing a big burden on the local populace for their existence. For example, a Thai private receives $ 248 per month but his Burmese counterpart only gets $22. How do we expect him to survive on that amount without bullying the people?
My request therefore is two fold:
To the UNODC: It’s time to start thinking of ways to work with independent civil society organizations (CSOs) to get your facts and figures right. How do you expect to formulate an effective drug control program without them?
To Burma’s ruling junta: You have been fighting the people for yourself for so long. It’s time you started fighting for them. You have also been militarizing politics for so long and it is getting the people nowhere. It’s time you really started demilitarizing politics and all political issues. Then all the people including yourself will be the winners. Thank you.
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